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Abstract 
Impulsive choice behavior incorporates the psychological mechanisms involved in the 
processing of the anticipated magnitude and delay until reward.  The goal of the present 
experiment was to determine whether individual differences in such processes related to 
individual differences in impulsive choice behavior.  Two groups of rats (Delay Group and 
Magnitude Group) were initially exposed to an impulsive choice task with choices between 
smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) rewards.  The Delay Group was subsequently exposed 
to a temporal discrimination task followed by a progressive interval task, whereas the Magnitude 
Group was exposed to a reward magnitude sensitivity task followed by a progressive ratio task.  
Inter-task correlations revealed that the rats in the Delay Group that made more self-controlled 
(LL) choices also displayed lower standard deviations in the temporal bisection task and greater 
delay tolerance in the progressive interval task.  Impulsive choice behavior in the Magnitude 
Group did not display any substantial correlations with the reward magnitude sensitivity and 
progressive ratio tasks.  The results indicate the importance of core timing processes in impulsive 
choice behavior, and encourage further research examining the effects of changes in core timing 
processes on impulsive choice. 
Keywords: impulsive behavior; discounting; timing; reinforcer magnitude; rats 
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 Impulsive choice has traditionally referred to the preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) 
outcome over a larger-later (LL) outcome.  When preference for the LL is more optimal in terms 
of rewards earned per unit of time, impulsive choices are indicative of deficient decision making.  
Indeed, the tendency to make impulsive choices has been associated with several maladaptive 
behaviors and clinical disorders such as substance use and abuse (e.g., Bickel & Marsch, 2001), 
gambling (e.g., Reynolds, 2006), obesity (e.g., Bruce et al., 2011; Weller, Cook, Avsar, & Cox, 
2008), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & 
Metevia, 2001; Bitsakou, Psychogiou, Thompson, & Sonuga-Barke, 2009; Marco et al., 2009), 
schizophrenia (Heerey, Robinson, McMahon, & Gold, 2007), depression (Imhoff, Harris, 
Weiser, & Reynolds, 2013), borderline personality disorder (Lawrence, Allen, & Chanen, 2010), 
and Parkinson’s disease with a comorbidity of impulsive-compulsive behavior (Housden, 
O'Sullivan, Joyce, Lees, & Roiser, 2010). 
In humans, individual differences in impulsive choice are relatively stable over time with 
test-retest reliability statistics in the range of other trait variables (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 
2003; Jimura et al., 2011; Johnson, Bickel, & Baker, 2007; Kirby, 2009; Matusiewicz, Carter, 
Landes, & Yi, 2013; Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 2006; Peters & Büchel, 2009).  
Recent research in rats has also revealed stable individual differences in impulsive choice across 
testing conditions, suggesting that rats may also exhibit trait impulsivity (Galtress, Garcia, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2012; Garcia & Kirkpatrick, 2013).  However, despite the clear importance of 
individual differences in impulsive choice in predicting a wide range of behavioral problems 
(e.g., MacKillop & Kahler, 2009; Perry & Carroll, 2008), the source of such individual 
differences remains poorly understood.  Therefore, examining the underlying mechanisms that 
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contribute to variability in impulsive choice will help elucidate the source of individual 
differences as well as identify the primary factor(s) driving impulsivity. 
 One possible source of the individual differences in impulsive choice is the core temporal 
processing mechanism involved in delay processing (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).  One such 
factor that could explain individual differences is poor precision in timing due to increased 
variance (noise) in timing processes (see Galtress et al., 2012; Smith, Marshall, & Kirkpatrick, 
under review).  An alternative possibility that has been suggested is that the tendency to make 
impulsive choices may be a direct result of subjective overestimation of the delay until reward 
delivery due to poor timing accuracy (McGuire & Kable, 2013; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).  A 
number of diseases and disorders that involve deficits in impulsive choice also demonstrate a co-
morbidity of disruptions in time processing (accuracy and/or precision), such as schizophrenia, 
ADHD, and substance abuse disorders (see Allman & Meck, 2011; Barkley et al., 2001; Bickel 
& Marsch, 2001; Heerey et al., 2007; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). 
Behavioral research examining the relationship between impulsive choice and timing in 
humans has also indicated that more impulsive individuals tend to overestimate interval 
durations (Baumann & Odum, 2012) and exhibit earlier start times on a fixed interval schedule 
(Darcheville, Rivière, & Wearden, 1992), suggesting that individual differences in impulsive 
choice in humans may be affected by corresponding individual differences in anticipatory time 
perception (Kim & Zauberman, 2009).  Additionally, previous research has identified poor 
temporal discrimination capabilities in impulsive individuals (van den Broek, Bradshaw, & 
Szabadi, 1992), suggesting that these individuals exhibit reduced temporal precision relative to 
non-impulsive controls.  Finally, poor timing abilities have been linked to delay aversion (which 
is a predictor of impulsive choice).  Delay aversion stems from the motivation to reduce the 
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overall delay to reward due to the subjectively aversive nature of waiting during delays to reward 
(Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, Sembi, & Smith, 1992).  Delay aversion may be related to 
overestimation of intervals and/or poor temporal precision, as individuals motivated to decrease 
overall delay may have reduced experience with longer durations due to opting for shorter 
delays; this reduced experience would then also predispose impulsive individuals with less 
opportunities to experience and learn longer temporal delays, potentially exaggerating the 
problem (see Galtress et al., 2012, for a relevant discussion). 
Ballard and Knutson (2009) also reported that activity within the posterior parietal and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, areas associated with temporal processing, was negatively 
correlated with both the delay to reward and increased levels of impulsivity (see Leon & 
Shadlen, 2003; Nenadic et al., 2003; Rao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001).  However, Baumann and 
Odum (2012) showed that impulsivity was not significantly correlated with the standard 
deviation of the psychophysical function from a temporal bisection task, suggesting that 
impulsive choice and temporal precision were unrelated.  Thus, the combined behavioral and 
neurobiological evidence seem to indicate a potential relationship between timing processes and 
impulsive choice in humans, but further evidence is warranted. 
Little research has, however, examined timing-choice relationships in rats, a popular pre-
clinical model of impulsive choice behavior.  To our knowledge, three studies have examined 
this relationship, demonstrating some indication of correlations between interval timing and 
impulsive choice.  In two of these studies (Galtress et al., 2012; Heilbronner & Meck, 2013), the 
timing-choice relationship was measured within the impulsive choice task, and the correlations 
were not particularly robust.  Galtress et al. (2012) suggested that the dynamics inherent in the 
choice procedure may reduce the ability to identify relationships between individual differences 
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in interval timing and impulsive choice when measured within the same task.  For example, if an 
individual rat selected the SS delay on most trials, then they would have little exposure to the LL 
delay, which could produce an inaccurate metric of that rat’s LL timing behavior.  More recently, 
McClure, Podos, and Richardson (2014) investigated the relationship between interval timing 
and impulsive choice in separate procedures, and found that the rats that timed with greater 
precision in a peak procedure were also those that made fewer impulsive choices.  However, 
these authors posited that such a relationship may be more effectively studied by employing a 
temporal discrimination task to measure interval timing processes.  Furthermore, another 
important factor related to timing processes is that impulsive choice behavior may be driven by 
an aversion to longer delays to reward (see Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992), which has been suggested 
as a key predictor of ADHD (see Bitsakou et al., 2009).  Delay aversion could interact 
importantly with timing processes, as discussed above, and is a potentially important contributor 
to any timing-choice relationships.  Therefore, the present experiment sought to determine the 
relationship between timing, delay aversion and choice behavior in rats by collecting 
measurements of core timing processes and delay aversion outside of the impulsive choice task. 
A second cognitive process that is likely involved in impulsive choice is reward 
magnitude processing, and differential sensitivities to reward magnitudes may explain individual 
differences in impulsive choice (see Locey & Dallery, 2009).  Consistent with this idea, several 
diseases and disorders that involve impulsive choice deficits also express co-morbidities in 
reward processing deficits, such as ADHD and related impulse control disorders, substance 
abuse, and gambling (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Bechara, Dolan, & Hindes, 2002; Cherniawsky 
& Holroyd, 2013; Cubillo, Halari, Smith, Taylor, & Rubia, 2012; Ripke et al., 2012; Verdejo-
García, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008; Wilbertz et al., 2012).  Furthermore, impulsive choice is 
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correlated with activity in the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens, posterior cingulate cortex, 
and medial prefrontal cortex (Andrews et al., 2011; Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Cooper, Kable, 
Kim, & Zauberman, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Ripke et al., 2012; Sripada, Gonzalez, Luan 
Phan, & Liberzon, 2011; Verdejo-García et al., 2008).  Activation in these brain areas is 
positively correlated with the subjective value of the LL reward (Ballard & Knutson, 2009; 
Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Ripke et al., 2012), and these regions are well-established components 
of the reward valuation circuit (e.g., Peters & Büchel, 2010, 2011).  In addition, lesions of the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Mobini et al., 2002) and nucleus accumbens (Cardinal, Pennicott, 
Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001; Galtress & Kirkpatrick, 2010b) increase impulsive 
choice behavior in rats.  Therefore, these findings support the relationship between reward 
magnitude processing, incentive motivation, and impulsive choice.  Unfortunately, there have 
been relatively few direct observations of this relationship, particularly in rodent pre-clinical 
models (but see Locey & Dallery, 2009).  Accordingly, the present study employed measures of 
reward magnitude sensitivity and incentive motivation to work for rewards of different 
magnitudes (i.e., elasticity/efficacy of reward) to determine potential relationships with 
impulsive choice behavior in rats. 
The assessments of timing and reward magnitude processing were conducted in separate 
groups, as preliminary research in our laboratory has found carry-over effects from reward 
magnitude sensitivity testing that affected later assessment of temporal sensitivity (Galtress & 
Kirkpatrick, unpublished data), which is consistent with a recent report on carry-over effects 
when utilizing multiple tasks from different domains (Marusich, Darna, Charnigo, Dwoskin, & 
Bardo, 2011).  The determination of a relationship between impulsive choice and timing and/or 
reward sensitivity would have considerable implications for the development of behavioral 
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interventions targeting the psychological and neurobiological correlates of temporal and reward 
processing (see Smith et al., under review). 
Methods 
Animals 
 Twenty-four experimentally-naïve male Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles River, Portage, 
MI) were used in the experiment.  They arrived to the facility (Kansas State University, 
Manhattan, KS) at approximately 42-45 days of age.  The rats were pair-housed within a colony 
room that was set to a 12-hr light:dark schedule (lights off at 6 pm).  The rats were tested 
overnight during their dark phase.  There was ad libitum access to water in their home cages and 
in the experimental chambers.  The rats were maintained at approximately 85% of their projected 
ad libitum weight during the experiment based on growth curves obtained from the supplier.  In 
addition to earning food pellets during the experiment, they were fed in their home cages 
following the experimental session. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in 24 operant chambers (Med-Associates; St. Albans, VT) 
each housed within sound-attenuating, ventilated boxes (74 × 38 × 60 cm).  Each chamber (25 × 
30 × 30 cm) was equipped with a stainless steel grid floor, two stainless steel walls (front and 
back), and a transparent polycarbonate side wall, ceiling, and door.  Two pellet dispensers (ENV-
203), mounted on the outside of the operant chamber, delivered 45-mg food pellets (Bio-Serv; 
Frenchtown, NJ) to a food cup (ENV-200R7) centered on the lower section of the front wall.  
Head entries into the food magazine were transduced by an infrared photobeam (ENV-254).  
Two retractable levers (ENV-112CM) were located on opposite sides of the food cup.  The 
chamber was also equipped with a house light (ENV-215) that was centered at the top of the 
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front wall, as well as two nose-poke key lights (ENV-119M-1) that were located above the 
levers.  Water was continuously available from a sipper tube that protruded through the back 
wall.  Experimental events were controlled and recorded with 2-ms resolution using MED-PC IV 
(Tatham & Zurn, 1989). 
Procedure 
The rats were randomly assigned to two groups (n = 12), the Delay Group and the 
Magnitude Group.  All experimental sessions took place overnight, lasting for a maximum of 14 
hr.  Previous research in our laboratory using long sessions has resulted in stable and systematic 
choice behavior (Galtress et al., 2012; Galtress & Kirkpatrick, 2010b; Kirkpatrick, Marshall, 
Clarke, & Cain, 2013), which is ideal for collecting stable individual differences measurements.  
The sessions were divided into blocks with inter-block intervals imposed to attenuate satiety over 
the course of the long testing period. 
Initial training.  The initial training procedure involved one session of magazine training 
and lever-press training delivered in four blocks, each separated by a 30-min inter-block interval 
(IBI); one rat required a second session of initial training.  In Block 1 (magazine training), 30 
food pellets were delivered on a random-time 60-s schedule.  In Block 2, the rats were trained to 
press the left and right levers on a fixed ratio (FR) 1 schedule.  The FR1 block was divided into 
four sub-blocks, in which the left or right lever was presented until 10 reinforcers were earned 
for pressing the corresponding lever.  The FR1 block lasted until 20 reinforcers were delivered 
on each lever.  A 10-min interval separated sub-blocks.  In Block 3, a random ratio (RR) 3 
schedule was delivered across four sub-blocks.  During each sub-block, both levers were 
presented until five reinforcers were earned on each.  The sub-blocks were separated by a 10-min 
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interval, and the RR3 block continued until 20 reinforcers were earned on each lever.  Block 4 
involved an RR5 schedule, which was otherwise identical to the RR3 schedule. 
Delay Group.  The Delay Group received training on the impulsive choice task with 
variations in the delay to the SS outcome, followed by testing with a temporal bisection task and 
a progressive interval (PI) task. 
Impulsive choice task.  The impulsive choice task involved the delivery of four 50-trial 
blocks; there was a 30-min interval that occurred prior to the first block, and a 90-min IBI 
(Galtress et al., 2012; Garcia & Kirkpatrick, 2013; Kirkpatrick et al., 2013).  Each block included 
30 free choice (SS vs. LL), 8 SS forced, 8 LL forced, 2 SS peak, and 2 LL peak trials (see 
Roberts, 1981), delivered in a random order.  The assignment of SS and LL outcomes to the left 
and right levers was counterbalanced across rats.  On free-choice trials, both levers were inserted 
into the chamber; a lever press on one lever resulted in retraction of the other lever, illumination 
of the cue light above the chosen lever, and initiation of the corresponding delay.  The first lever 
press on the chosen lever following the delay terminated the trial, and resulted in lever retraction, 
offset of the cue light, and food delivery.  Forced choice trials were identical to free choice trials, 
except that only one lever was inserted.  Peak trials were identical to forced choice trials, except 
that food was omitted, and the trial continued for 90 s, after which the corresponding lever was 
retracted and the cue light was turned off.  There was a 120-s intertrial interval (ITI) that 
separated trials.  Sessions lasted until all four blocks were completed, 240 reinforcers were 
delivered, or 14 hr had elapsed.  The SS outcome was 1 pellet after a 30, 10, 5, and 2.5 s delay in 
Phases 1-4, respectively, and the LL outcome was 2 pellets after a 30 s delay.  Each phase lasted 
for 10 sessions.  The final five sessions of Phases 2 and 4 were used for analysis.  Due to an 
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equipment error that resulted in the loss of data, sessions 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Phase 1 and 
sessions 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 of Phase 3 were used for analysis. 
Temporal bisection task.  The temporal bisection task was used to evaluate individual 
differences in temporal processing (e.g., Church & Deluty, 1977).  Each session consisted of 
three blocks of trials, separated by a 90-min IBI, with a 30-min interval preceding the onset of 
the first block.  During the training phase, the rats were trained to discriminate stimulus durations 
of a house light cue that lasted for 4 or 12 s, pseudo-randomly alternated.  Following house light 
offset, both levers were inserted into the chamber, corresponding to the “short” or “long” 
choices; the short and long levers were the same as the SS and LL levers, respectively, in the 
impulsive choice task.  Following the rats’ choice, both levers were retracted.  If the rat made the 
correct choice, then 1 food pellet was delivered and a 15-s ITI began.  If the rat made the 
incorrect choice, then correction trials continued until the rat made the correct choice and reward 
was delivered; there was a 5-s ITI between an incorrect choice and the onset of a correction trial.  
Each training block lasted until 80 correct choices were made, with no limit on the number of 
correction trials.  Training lasted for five days at which point the group mean of initial correct 
choices exceeded 80% for the preceding two days. 
 Subsequently, training and test sessions were intermixed, such that there was a training 
session following each set of three test sessions, with 12 total test sessions delivered.  During the 
test sessions, the rats were exposed to a series of non-reinforced intermediate durations that were 
randomly intermixed with the training trials.  Training trials were delivered in an identical 
manner as in the bisection training phase.  An additional 14 test trials (without any correction 
trials) were presented within each of three blocks, for a total of 94 trials per block.  These 14 test 
trials delivered two of each of the following durations: 4.00, 5.26, 6.04, 6.93, 7.94, 9.12, and 
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12.00 s.  There was a 15-s ITI following test trials.  Both training and test sessions lasted until 
the three blocks were completed or 14 hr had elapsed.  The last five days of testing were used for 
data analysis.  
PI task.  A discrete-trial PI task evaluated the rats’ subjective tolerance for increasingly 
longer delays to reward.  The task was divided into four blocks with an 80-min IBI and a 30-min 
interval before the onset of the first block.  Trial onset was cued by insertion of the left lever; the 
first response after the target delay had elapsed resulted in delivery of 1 food pellet, lever 
retraction, and the onset of a 30-s ITI.  The target duration for the first trial was equal to the PI 
duration (e.g., 2.5 s), and this delay incremented arithmetically by the PI duration for each 
subsequent trial.  The PI length was 2.5, 5, 10, and 30 s in Phases 1-4, respectively.  If 10 min 
elapsed without a response on the left lever, then the lever retracted, the IBI began, and the PI 
interval length reset to the initial PI value for the subsequent block.  The interval duration that 
had been most recently completed upon block termination was regarded as the breakpoint.  Each 
session lasted until four blocks were completed, or 14 hr had elapsed.  Phase 1 lasted for 3 
sessions, and Phases 2-4 lasted for two sessions each.  For the majority of the rats, the last day of 
each phase was used for analysis.  Due to data loss, the second session of Phase 1 was used for 
analysis of one rat’s data, and, the first session of Phase 4 was used for analysis of two rats’ data.  
For all rats, only the completed blocks were used for data analysis. 
Magnitude Group.  The Magnitude Group received the impulsive choice task with 
variations in the LL magnitude followed by testing with the reward magnitude sensitivity task 
and the progressive ratio (PR) task.  
Impulsive choice task.  The impulsive choice task delivered to the Magnitude Group was 
identical to the task given to the Delay Group, with the exception that the SS was 1 pellet 
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delivered after 10 s, and the LL was 1, 2, 3, or 4 pellets delivered after 30 s in Phases 1-4, 
respectively. 
 Reward magnitude sensitivity task.  The reward magnitude sensitivity task was used to 
evaluate individual differences in reward magnitude discrimination (Galtress & Kirkpatrick, 
2010b; Kirkpatrick et al., 2013).  The task was divided into three 80-trial blocks, with a 90-min 
IBI and a 30-min interval that occurred prior to the first block.  On each trial, either the left or 
right lever was inserted into the chamber, with order pseudo-randomly alternating. Presses on the 
lever were reinforced according to a random interval (RI) 30-s schedule; each interval was 
randomly drawn from an exponential distribution with a mean of 30 s.  Trials were separated by 
a random-time 120-s ITI.  Initially, both levers delivered 1 pellet on each trial.  Following the 
baseline phase (Phase 1), the reward magnitude on one lever (i.e., the lever on which LL rewards 
had been arranged in the impulsive choice task) was increased to 2, 3, and 4 pellets in Phases 2-
4, respectively.  Each session lasted until all three blocks were completed, 240 reinforcers were 
delivered, or 14 hr had elapsed.  Phase 1 lasted for 15 sessions to establish initial baseline 
performance and Phases 2-4 lasted for 5 sessions each.  Response rates on the two levers across 
the last three sessions of each phase were used for data analysis. 
 PR task.  A discrete-trials PR3 task was used to evaluate incentive motivation to work for 
different reward magnitudes, a measure of elasticity and efficacy of reward (Bickel, Marsch, & 
Carroll, 2000; Hodos, 1961).  The task was divided into four blocks with an 80-min IBI and a 
30-min interval prior to the first block.  The left lever was inserted to initiate a trial, and an initial 
response requirement of three responses earned the first reinforcer.  The response requirement 
increased by three responses following each reinforcer earned.  Following completion of the 
response requirement, the trial terminated, resulting in food delivery, lever retraction, and onset 
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of a 30-s ITI.  If 10 min elapsed without a lever response, then the lever retracted, the IBI began, 
and the initial response requirement for the subsequent block was reset to three.  The ratio 
requirement that had been most recently completed upon block termination was regarded as the 
breakpoint.  Each session lasted until all four blocks were completed, or 14 hr had elapsed.  In 
Phases 1-4 of the PR task, food reward was 1, 2, 3, and 4 pellets, respectively.  Phase 1 lasted for 
3 sessions, and Phases 2-4 lasted for two sessions each.  The last session of each phase and only 
the completed blocks within the session were used for data analysis. 
Data Analysis 
 The approaches to deriving and analyzing specific measures within each task are 
discussed below.  All summary measures were obtained from the raw data using MATLAB (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) and all statistical analyses were conducted in SPSS (IBM, Armonk, 
NY).  The alpha value for significance testing was .05 and only the significant results are 
presented. 
Results 
Delay Group 
 Impulsive choice task.  Figure 1 shows the individual rat (lines) and group mean (bars) 
log odds of LL choices as a function of SS delay.  The log odds of LL choices is a more sensitive 
measure to detect individual differences in choice behavior as this measure reduces ceiling and 
floor effects imposed by percentage choice measures.  Log odds also more readily meets the 
scaling assumptions of parametric analyses due to the removal of artificial restrictions (i.e., the 0 
– 100 range of percentage measures) on variance in the data collected at different choice points.  
Accordingly, log odds was computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the number of LL 
choices to the number of SS choices.  To account for exclusive choice for the SS or LL outcome, 
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a value of 0.5 was added to both the numerator and denominator of the odds ratio (see Garcia & 
Kirkpatrick, 2013; Haldane, 1956).  As the SS delay increased, the rats increased their choices 
for the LL outcome.  However, there were considerable individual differences in choice behavior 
that were relatively stable across testing conditions, consistent with recent findings (Galtress et 
al., 2012; Garcia & Kirkpatrick, 2013).  Specifically, reliability analyses indicated that the rats’ 
choices demonstrated excellent consistency across phases, α = .91, in accordance with criteria 
suggested previously (George & Mallery, 2003).  A repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed a significant effect of SS delay on LL choices, F(3, 33) = 105.98, p < .001, 
p2 = .91. 
Temporal bisection task.  Figure 2 shows the proportion of choices for the long lever as 
a function of the duration of the house light stimulus on non-reinforced test trials.  As the 
stimulus duration increased, the number of long responses increased, F(6, 66) = 100.46, p < .001, 
p2 = .90.  There were considerable individual differences in the psychophysical functions that 
were consistent across stimulus durations, α = .73.  A cumulative logistic distribution was fit to 
each rat’s psychophysical function using MatLab: 1/e-(x-)/, in which x was the stimulus 
duration, μ was the mean of the function (an index of timing accuracy), and σ was the standard 
deviation of the function (an index of timing precision, or noise in timing).  The logistic function 
provided good fits to the data, accounting for a mean of 96% of the variance.  Table 1 shows the 
best-fitting parameters for each rat.  One-sample t-tests revealed that the mean of the logistic 
function was not statistically different from the geometric mean of the anchor durations of 4 s 
and 12 s (6.93 s), but did significantly differ from both the arithmetic (8 s), t(11) = 3.35, p = 
.007, and harmonic means (6 s), t(11) = 5.68, p < .001. 
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PI task.  Figure 3 shows the breakpoint as a function of the PI increment.  A later 
breakpoint is a measure of greater tolerance to increasingly longer delays to reinforcement.  
There was a significant increase in breakpoint as PI increment increased, F(3, 33) = 42.08, p < 
.001, p2 = .79.  There were also considerable and consistent individual differences across PI 
durations, α = .68. 
Inter-task correlations.  Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to determine if 
individual differences in impulsive choice (Figure 1) could be accounted for by individual 
differences in interval timing (Figure 2) and delay tolerance (Figure 3).  From the impulsive 
choice task, the two measures entered into the correlational analysis were the mean log odds of 
LL choices across SS delays (a measure of bias in choice) and the slope of the log odds as a 
function of normalized SS delay (a measure of adaptability of choice behavior; scaled from 0 to 
1, so that the predictor values were .08, .16, .33, and 1 for SS delays of 2.5, 5, 10, and 30 s, 
respectively).  Specifically, the mean log odds of LL choices reflects bias, as a greater mean is 
indicative of a greater LL choice bias, in much the same way that greater area-under-the-curve 
values reflect more LL choices (Garcia & Kirkpatrick, 2013; Myerson, Green, & 
Warusawitharana, 2001).  Furthermore, the slope of the function reflects sensitivity to 
manipulations of SS delay.  Two temporal bisection measures (mean and standard deviation of 
the fitted logistic function) and one PI measure (mean breakpoint across all PI increments) were 
correlated against the measures from the impulsive choice task.  There were significant 
relationships between the mean log odds of LL choices and the standard deviation of the 
bisection function, r = -.73, p = .007. There was also a significant relationship between mean log 
odds of LL choices and mean breakpoint in the PI task, r = .63, p = .028 (Figure 4).  Finally, 
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there was a significant relationship between the standard deviation of the bisection function and 
mean breakpoint in the PI task, r = -.59, p = .045. 
Magnitude Group 
Impulsive choice task.  Figure 5 shows the log odds of LL choices as a function of LL 
reward magnitude.  As reward magnitude increased, the rats significantly increased their choices 
for the LL outcome, F(3, 33) = 115.09, p < .001, p2 = .91.  Furthermore, there were 
considerable individual differences in choice behavior that were relatively stable across the 
different LL magnitudes, with good consistency across reward magnitudes, α = .86. 
Reward magnitude sensitivity task.  Figure 6 shows the discrimination ratios (DRs) as 
a function of the large lever reward magnitude.  The DRs were computed for each rat by dividing 
response rate on the large-reward lever by the sum of the rates on both levers.  Response rate was 
calculated as the mean responses per minute during the first 30 s of each trial, as the 
exponentially-distributed RI 30 s schedule included occasional very long intervals which can be 
accompanied by decreases in response rate over time.  There were considerable individual 
differences in DRs that were consistent across all reward magnitude conditions, α = .80, and all 
differential reward magnitude conditions (i.e., 1 pellet vs. 2, 3, or 4 pellets), α = .84.  There was a 
main effect of large lever reward magnitude on DRs, F(3, 33) = 21.06, p < .001, p2 = .66; post-
hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that this effect was due to significantly lower 
DRs when the large reward was 1 pellet, ps < .05 compared to the 2, 3, and 4 pellet phases.  One-
sample t-tests indicated that when the reward magnitude of both the small and large levers was 
equal to 1 pellet, the DR did not significantly differ from .50, but the DRs were significantly 
greater than .50 when the large lever resulted in 2, 3 or 4 pellets, smallest t(11) = 3.46, p = .005.   
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PR task.  Figure 7 shows the breakpoints as a function of reward magnitude.  A higher 
breakpoint is indicative of greater incentive motivation to work for rewards of different 
magnitudes.  There were considerable and consistent individual differences across reward 
magnitudes, α = .85.  There was a main effect of reward magnitude, F(3, 33) = 14.82, p < .001, 
p2 = .57, which was due to a lower breakpoint when the PR reward magnitude was 2 pellets, ps 
< .05, compared to the other conditions, which did not differ. 
Inter-task correlations.  Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to determine if 
individual differences in impulsive choice (Figure 5) were related to differences in reward 
magnitude sensitivity (Figure 6) and incentive motivation (Figure 7).  Two impulsive choice 
measures (mean log odds of LL choices and the slope of this function over the LL magnitudes), 
two reward magnitude sensitivity measures (the mean DR across the 2-, 3-, and 4-pellet large 
reward conditions; and the mean DR for the 2-4 pellet phases minus the DR in the 1-pellet 
phase), and one PR measure (mean breakpoint across all reward magnitudes) were subjected to 
correlational analysis.  For the choice function slope, the LL magnitudes were re-scaled from 0 
to 1 so that the predictor values were .25, .50, .75, and 1.00 for the magnitudes of 1, 2, 3, and 4 
pellets to produce comparable scaling to the Delay Group.  The DR from the reward sensitivity 
test and PR breakpoint were significantly correlated, r = -.72, p = .008 (Figure 8).  There were no 
correlations between the reward sensitivity/incentive motivation measures and either measure of 
impulsive choice. 
Discussion 
The present study sought to determine the underlying processes involved in impulsive 
choice by utilizing procedures designed to assess interval timing and delay aversion (Delay 
Group) as well as reward magnitude sensitivity and incentive motivation (Magnitude Group).  
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The present interpretations of the results are specific to the set of tasks completed by each group.  
Specifically, holding reward magnitude constant in the Delay Group’s impulsive choice task 
allowed for understanding the relationship between interval timing and impulsive choice, and the 
same was the case for the Magnitude Group.  Given these task differences, a between-groups 
comparison of the correlational analyses conducted on the two groups is not attempted here.  The 
primary aim of the present report was to determine the within-group timing- and reward-related 
correlates of impulsive choice, rather than to determine whether core timing mechanisms are 
more or less predictive than reward-related mechanisms of impulsive choice behavior.  
Accordingly, given the distinct patterns revealed by these assessments, the results produced by 
each group are discussed separately. 
Impulsive Choice, Interval Timing, and Delay Aversion 
 The behavioral assessments of the Delay Group indicated that the mean log odds of LL 
choices (i.e., a measure of bias in impulsive choice behavior) was associated with imprecise 
timing and delay intolerance/aversion (Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992), as assessed through the 
standard deviation of the bisection psychophysical function and PI breakpoints, respectively.  
The present results corroborate a recent finding that rats exhibiting greater timing precision in a 
peak procedure also demonstrated greater self-control (McClure et al., 2014).  Behavioral 
interventions designed to increase self-control by improving interval timing have also shown that 
temporal precision was primarily and more robustly affected via such manipulations, with little 
or no change in timing accuracy (Smith et al., under review).  Furthermore, in conjunction with 
previous research in humans (see Odum, 2011a, 2011b) and rats (Galtress et al., 2012), the 
individual differences observed in the corresponding procedures were relatively stable across 
conditions, suggesting that the psychological processes of impulsive choice, timing behavior, and 
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delay aversion reflect underlying stable trait variables in rats.  Ultimately, the present results 
demonstrate a clear relationship between core timing processes and impulsive choice, and 
suggest that timing processes may play a role in delay aversion (and/or vice versa), which could 
thereby drive impulsive choice behaviors.  Therefore, future attempts to decrease impulsive 
behaviors should target and seek to improve the functioning of core timing processes through 
reductions in variability in timing (Smith et al., under review). 
The proposed relationship between interval timing mechanisms and impulsive choice 
behavior is not without precedent (e.g., McClure et al., 2014; McGuire & Kable, 2012, 2013; 
Rubia, Halari, Christakou, & Taylor, 2009; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).  Impulsive choice as a 
function of delay is well accounted for by a hyperbolic discounting function (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; 
Mazur, 1987), which has been proposed to occur as a result of a logarithmic representation of 
time (Cui, 2011; Gibbon, 1977; Han & Takahashi, 2012; Takahashi, 2005).  Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that the tendency to make impulsive choices is due to an overestimation of the 
duration of a delay (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).  Baumann and Odum (2012) reported such a 
relationship, showing that humans who made more SS choices also exhibited shorter means of 
the psychophysical function within a temporal bisection task (i.e., they perceived interval 
durations as longer than those who more often chose LL rewards).  They also showed a non-
significant negative relationship between the tendency to make LL choices and the standard 
deviation of the bisection function, consistent with the significant negative correlations between 
the bisection standard deviation and the log odds of LL choices in the present experiment (Figure 
4).  Therefore, in conjunction with previous research, the current results suggest that augmented 
levels of impulsivity may be governed by deficiencies in interval timing. 
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Because the present results are purely correlational, the direction of causality in the 
relationship between impulsive choice, timing, and delay tolerance remains to be determined.  
There is some precedent for the suggestion that temporal precision may be a contributing factor 
in decisions between differentially delayed rewards (see Brunner, Gibbon, & Fairhurst, 1994; 
Gibbon, Church, Fairhurst, & Kacelnik, 1988).  For example, greater temporal imprecision may 
be related to more suboptimal choice behavior in a time-left procedure (Gibbon & Church, 
1981), in terms of rewards earned per unit of time (see Brunner et al., 1994).  Indeed, with the 
current parameters, LL preference resulted in molar maximizing in all cases (see Flora & Pavlik, 
1992), so the present results corroborate the previously proposed relationship between greater 
temporal imprecision and more suboptimal (impulsive) choices. 
Alternatively, a second potential causal pathway driving impulsive choice behavior 
involves delay aversion as the primary factor, which could then produce secondary effects on 
interval timing.  For example, Kim and Zauberman (2009) reported a significant positive 
relationship between human individuals’ subjective discounting rates of delayed rewards and 
their diminishing sensitivities to increasing delays, which may be comparable to a decreased 
delay tolerance in the current PI task.  Delay aversion has also been identified as a key 
behavioral trait of individuals with ADHD in relation to impulsive choice behavior (Bitsakou et 
al., 2009; Marco et al., 2009; Solanto et al., 2001), and has been suggested to be the explanatory 
factor producing an avoidance of long LL delays and preference for shorter SS delays (i.e., the 
delay aversion hypothesis; see Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992).  The rats in the present experiment 
that were more tolerant of longer delays to reward in the PI task were also those that made more 
self-controlled (LL) choices (Figure 4).  Furthermore, individuals with ADHD have also been 
shown to exhibit deficits in temporal precision in a temporal bisection task (Suarez, Lopera, 
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Pineda, & Casini, 2013).  Therefore, if the dual impairment in temporal sensitivity and impulsive 
decision making were caused by inherent tendencies to avoid aversively long delays to reward, 
then delay aversion/tolerance may reflect the primary mechanism governing decisions between 
differentially delayed and sized rewards. 
The promotion of self-control due to decreases in variance in timing in rats suggests that 
core timing processes play a causal role in impulsive choice (Smith et al., under review), but it is 
additionally possible that delay aversion is a second causal pathway, and it may be the case that 
timing processes and delay aversion interact to produce impulsive choice.  Alternatively, the 
individuals’ behavior across tasks may reflect the influence of another underlying mechanism 
that collectively affects the corresponding task performances.  For instance, differential 
attentional capacities and subjective attention to time have been employed to explain behavior in 
interval timing and impulsive choice tasks (see Ebert & Prelec, 2007; Fortin, 2003; Fortin & 
Massé, 2000; Galtress & Kirkpatrick, 2010a; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009).  
Therefore, further research should attempt to pinpoint the role of these two different processes in 
impulsive choice behavior. 
In contrast to the strong correlations between the secondary task measures and mean LL 
choices, there were no significant relationships with the slope of the log odds of LL choices 
function.  This may have been at least partially due to the relatively small individual variability 
in the slopes of the impulsive choice function (see Figure 1).  Alternatively, sensitivity to the 
changes in delay to reward may reflect a different psychological mechanism from those of delay 
aversion and temporal precision that may require testing with additional procedures.  The slope 
of the impulsive choice function is a measure of adaptability in choice behavior, so it is possible 
that metrics of behavioral flexibility would correlate with the slope measure.  Second, there were 
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no significant correlations between the mean of the temporal bisection function and the two 
measures of impulsive choice.  These results seemingly reflect independence between 
mechanisms of impulsivity and temporal accuracy, which is inconsistent with previous human 
research demonstrating a relationship between impulsive choice and over- versus under-
estimations of temporal intervals (e.g., Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).  However, these 
discrepancies may be partially explained by task demands and/or species differences.  Indeed, a 
recent study investigating the relationship between impulsive choice and interval timing showed 
that rats that were more impulsive also exhibited poorer temporal precision in a peak procedure 
task; importantly, these authors failed to identify a relationship between temporal accuracy and 
impulsive choice (McClure et al., 2014).  Given the ecological validity of animal models of 
choice behavior (see Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011), impulsive decision making may 
actually be driven by how well individuals subjectively discriminate different delays to reward 
rather than how well they track the objective durations of such intervals.  Alternatively, the 
relationship between temporal precision and impulsive choice may be mediated by some third 
factor (McClure et al., 2014), such as delay aversion or attention to time (as described above).  
However, the small sample size of the present experiment inhibits our ability to detect a 
potentially significant mediation of delay aversion (see Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007).  Thus, future 
research should continue investigating the direct and mediated relationships between interval 
timing, delay aversion, and impulsive choice behavior. 
Impulsive Choice, Reward Magnitude Sensitivity, and Incentive Motivation  
 Despite the significant effect of reward magnitude on impulsive choice behavior (Figure 
5), the rats’ behavior in the reward magnitude sensitivity and incentive motivation (PR) tasks did 
not correlate with either the mean or slope measures of impulsive choice.  However, there was a 
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significant relationship between PR breakpoint and mean DR in the reward magnitude sensitivity 
task.  Specifically, higher DRs in the reward magnitude sensitivity task were associated with 
lower mean breakpoints in the PR task.  This relationship suggests that there is a shared 
mechanism in the two secondary tasks that may have been due to individual differences in 
incentive motivational processes.  For example, DRs often increase over an experimental session 
(McSweeney, Weatherly, & Swindell, 1996), whereas incentive motivation often decreases 
across an experimental session with increases in satiation (cf., Killeen, 1995), suggesting that 
reward magnitude discriminability may be related to more moderate levels of incentive 
motivation.  Alternatively, incentive motivation may affect how selectively the rat responds; that 
is, the rats with more moderate incentive motivational level may be more selective in their 
responding, potentially demonstrating greater responding for the larger reward in comparison to 
the small reward. 
The lack of correlation between behaviors within the reward magnitude sensitivity, PR, 
and impulsive choice tasks is unexpected given that previous research has demonstrated that 
activity within brain regions associated with incentive motivation and reward valuation is related 
to behavior within impulsive choice tasks (see Ballard & Knutson, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Ripke et al., 2012).  In addition, lesions of reward valuation brain regions have been 
shown to affect impulsive choice behavior in rats (e.g., Cardinal et al., 2001), and these effects 
have been linked to deficits in reward magnitude sensitivity (Galtress & Kirkpatrick, 2010b).  
Thus, it seems likely that reward magnitude sensitivity should contribute to individual 
differences in impulsive choice behavior.  One possible source of the lack of correlation between 
impulsive choice and the secondary reward tasks used here is that relative response rate may be a 
poor measure of reward magnitude sensitivity (cf., Bonem & Crossman, 1988).  For example, 
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Catania and Sagvolden (1980) reported that pigeons’ initial-link choice preferences in a 
concurrent chains paradigm were unrelated to their response rates in the terminal links.  
Furthermore, in an impulsive choice paradigm that manipulated reward magnitude, Galtress et al. 
(2012) showed that impulsive choice did not correlate with peak-trial response rate, suggesting a 
possible independence between the rate of responding for rewards and the choice between 
rewards. 
An additional possible issue may reflect the difference in task structure.  In the impulsive 
choice task, the rats were able to choose the magnitudes that they received, whereas in the 
reward magnitude sensitivity and PR tasks, the magnitudes were determined by the experimental 
conditions.  Previous research suggests that choice is more sensitive to differences in reward 
magnitude relative to single-operant non-choice arrangements, such as in the two secondary 
reward tasks employed here (see Bonem & Crossman, 1988, for a review).  The present results 
corroborate this notion, as the two secondary tasks revealed stable individual differences in 
sensitivity to reward magnitude, and the tasks were correlated with each other, even though there 
was no correlation with impulsive choice.  Thus, it seems plausible that the mechanisms driving 
behavior in tasks involving experimenter-controlled reward magnitude exposure are distinct from 
those driving behavior in tasks involving subject-controlled reward magnitude exposure (i.e., 
impulsive choice tasks).  Therefore, to better understand how individual differences in reward 
processing contribute to individual differences in impulsive choice behavior, subsequent research 
should consider other methods to evaluate reward magnitude sensitivity, such as concurrent 
schedules of reinforcement. 
An additional factor that may have contributed to the poor correlation between choice 
and other reward measures is the order of delivery of the parameters of the impulsive choice 
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task.  All of the rats received the same sequence of delivery of the magnitudes within the 
impulsive choice task, which was an ascending sequence.  Previous work using a progressive 
interval versus fixed interval choice task demonstrated that an ascending sequence of magnitudes 
produced more optimal choice behavior (in terms of molar maximizing) than a descending 
sequence of magnitudes (Galtress et al., 2012), which is the reason for selection of this sequence 
for use in the present study.  In addition, in their experiments, the individual differences 
correlations between timing within the choice task and choice behavior were positive with the 
ascending sequence and negative with the descending sequence.  This suggests that testing order 
may play an important role in affecting individual differences, a factor that clearly requires 
further study.  The present study also did not counterbalance the order of delivery of the choice 
tasks and the secondary tasks which may have affected the results.  The choice task was 
delivered first to minimize any contamination of choice behavior by prior exposure to the 
rewards (or delays), which have been shown to alter choice behavior in children (e.g., 
Eisenberger & Adornetto, 1986).  However, it is possible that exposure to the choice task may 
have contaminated our secondary task measurements.  If so, then a different approach will be 
needed to assess individual differences in reward processing and choice behavior in future 
research. 
Conclusions  
 Individual differences in behavioral measures has become an increasingly critical topic 
for psychological study (Harzem, 1984; Odum, 2011a, 2011b; Odum & Baumann, 2010), and 
impulsivity is a particularly important individual difference variable given its relationship with a 
variety of other behavioral problems (see de Wit, 2008; Evenden, 1999; Perry & Carroll, 2008).  
The present experiment demonstrated that individual differences in temporal precision and delay 
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tolerance can account for substantial variance (~50%) in individual differences in impulsive 
choice.  As there have been relatively few empirical analyses regarding the relationship between 
interval timing and impulsive choice in nonhuman animals, the present results provide an 
important and novel contribution to the literature.  Specifically, the results suggest that individual 
differences in temporal precision and delay tolerance serve as critical predictors of an 
individual’s impulsive choices.  The results are consistent with the suggestion by Kim and 
Zauberman (2009) that individual differences in factors related to impulsive choice such as 
substance abuse (e.g., Bickel & Marsch, 2001), age (e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994), income 
(e.g., Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996), and intelligence (e.g., Shamosh & Gray, 
2008), may be parsimoniously accounted for by differences in time perception.  The current 
results unveil a potential avenue for the development of both rapid screening techniques and 
intervention protocols to address deficient impulsive decision making tendencies via the 
targeting of timing-related mechanisms (Smith et al., under review). 
  
Individual differences in choice and timing    28 
 
References 
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. 
Psychological Bulletin  82(4), 463-496.  
Allman, M. J., & Meck, W. H. (2011). Pathophysiological distortions in time perception and 
timed performance. Brain. doi: 10.1093/brain/awr210 
Andrews, M. M., Meda, S. A., Thomas, A. D., Potenza, M. N., Krystal, J. H., Worhunsky, P., . . . 
Pearlson, G. D. (2011). Individuals family history positive for alcoholism show 
functional magnetic resonance imaging differences in reward sensitivity that are related 
to impulsivity factors. Biological Psychiatry, 69(7), 675-683. doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.09.049 
Baker, F., Johnson, M. W., & Bickel, W. K. (2003). Delay discounting in current and never-
before cigarette smokers: similarities and differences across commodity, sign, and 
magnitude. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112(3), 382-392. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.112.3.382 
Ballard, K., & Knutson, B. (2009). Dissociable neural representations of future reward 
magnitude and delay during temporal discounting. NeuroImage, 45(1), 143-150. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.11.004 
Barkley, R. A., Edwards, G., Laneri, M., Fletcher, K., & Metevia, L. (2001). Executive 
functioning, temporal discounting, and sense of time in adolescents with attention 
deficity hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). 
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29(6), 541-556.  
Baumann, A. A., & Odum, A. L. (2012). Impulsivity, risk taking, and timing. Behavioural 
Processes, 90, 408-414. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2012.04.005 
Individual differences in choice and timing    29 
 
Bechara, A., Dolan, S., & Hindes, A. (2002). Decision-making and addiction (part II): Myopia 
for the future or hypersensitivity to reward? Neuropsychologia, 40(10), 1690-1705. doi: 
10.1016/S0028-3932(02)00016-7 
Bickel, W. K., & Marsch, L. A. (2001). Toward a behavioral economic understanding of drug 
dependence: delay discounting processes. Addiction, 96, 73-86. doi: 
10.1080/09652140020016978 
Bickel, W. K., Marsch, L. A., & Carroll, M. E. (2000). Deconstructing relative reinforcing 
efficacy and situating the measures of pharmacological reinforcement with behavioral 
economics: a theoretical proposal. Psychopharmacology, 153, 44-56. doi: 
10.1007/s002130000589 
Bitsakou, P., Psychogiou, L., Thompson, M., & Sonuga-Barke, E. J. (2009). Delay Aversion in 
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: An Empirical Investigation of the Broader 
Phenotype. Neuropsychologia, 47(2), 446-456. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.09.015 
Bonem, M., & Crossman, E. K. (1988). Elucidating the effects of reinforcement magnitude. 
Psychological Bulletin, 104(3), 348-362. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.104.3.348 
Bruce, A. S., Black, W. R., Bruce, J. M., Daldalian, M., Martin, L. E., & Davis, A. M. (2011). 
Ability to delay gratification and BMI in preadolescence. Obesity, 19(5), 1101-1102. doi: 
10.1038/oby.2010.297 
Brunner, D., Gibbon, J., & Fairhurst, S. (1994). Choice between fixed and variable delays with 
different reward amounts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 20(4), 331-346.  
Individual differences in choice and timing    30 
 
Cardinal, R. N., Pennicott, D. R., Sugathapala, C. L., Robbins, T. W., & Everitt, B. J. (2001). 
Impulsive choice induced in rats by lesions of the nucleus accumbens core. Science, 292, 
2499-2501.  
Catania, A. C., & Sagvolden, T. (1980). Preference for free choice over forced choice in pigeons. 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 34(1), 77-86. doi: 
10.1901/jeab.1980.34-77 
Cherniawsky, A. S., & Holroyd, C. B. (2013). High temporal discounters overvalue immediate 
rewards rather than undervalue future rewards: An event-related brain potential study. 
Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 13(1), 36-45. doi: 10.3758/s13415-012-
0122-x 
Church, R. M., & Deluty, M. Z. (1977). Bisection of temporal intervals. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 3(3), 216-228.  
Cooper, N., Kable, J. W., Kim, B. K., & Zauberman, G. (2013). Brain activity in valuation 
regions while thinking about the future predicts individual discount rates. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 33(32), 13150-13156.  
Cubillo, A., Halari, R., Smith, A., Taylor, E., & Rubia, K. (2012). A review of fronto-striatal and 
fronto-cortical brain abnormalities in children and adults with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and new evidence for dysfunction in adults with ADHD 
during motivation and attention. Cortex: A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous 
System and Behavior, 48(2), 194-215. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2011.04.007 
Cui, X. (2011). Hyperbolic discounting emerges from the scalar property of interval timing. 
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 5(24), 1-2.  
Individual differences in choice and timing    31 
 
Darcheville, J. C., Rivière, V., & Wearden, J. H. (1992). Fixed-interval performance and self-
control in children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 57(2), 187-199.  
de Wit, H. (2008). Impulsivity as a determinant and consequence of drug use: a review of 
underlying processes. Addiction Biology, 14, 22-31.  
Ebert, J. E. J., & Prelec, D. (2007). The fragility of time: time-insensitivity and valuation of the 
near and far future. Management Science, 53(9), 1423-1438. doi: 
10.1287/mnsc.1060.0671 
Eisenberger, R., & Adornetto, M. (1986). Generalized self-control of delay and effort. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology  51, 1020-1031.  
Evenden, J. L. (1999). Varieties of impulsivity. Psychopharmacology, 146, 348-361.  
Flora, S. R., & Pavlik, W. B. (1992). Human self-control and the density of reinforcement. 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 57(2), 201-208. doi: 
10.1901/jeab.1992.57-201 
Fortin, C. (2003). Attentional time-sharing in interval timing. In W. H. Meck (Ed.), Functional 
and neural mechanisms of interval timing (pp. 235-260). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Fortin, C., & Massé, N. (2000). Expecting a break in time estimation: Attentional time-sharing 
without concurrent processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 26, 1788-1796.  
Fritz, M. S., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2007). Required sample size to detect the mediated effect. 
Psychological Science, 18(3), 233-239. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01882.x 
Galtress, T., Garcia, A., & Kirkpatrick, K. (2012). Individual differences in impulsive choice and 
timing in rats. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 98(1), 65-87.  
Individual differences in choice and timing    32 
 
Galtress, T., & Kirkpatrick, K. (2010a). Reward magnitude effects on temporal discrimination. 
Learning and Motivation, 41, 108-124. doi: 10.1016/j.lmot.2010.01.002 
Galtress, T., & Kirkpatrick, K. (2010b). The role of the nucleus accumbens core in impulsive 
choice, timing, and reward processing. Behavioral Neuroscience, 124(1), 26-43.  
Galtress, T., & Kirkpatrick, K. (unpublished data). Reward magnitude and temporal sensitivity 
assessments in impulsive choice in rats.  
Garcia, A., & Kirkpatrick, K. (2013). Impulsive choice behavior in four strains of rats: 
Evaluation of possible models of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Behavioural 
Brain Research, 238, 10-22.  
George, D., & Mallery, P. (2003). SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide and 
Reference (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy theory and Weber's law in animal timing. Psychological 
Review, 94(3), 279-325. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.279 
Gibbon, J., & Church, R. M. (1981). Time left: linear versus logarithmic subjective time. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 7(2), 87-108. doi: 
10.1037/0097-7403.7.2.87 
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., Fairhurst, S., & Kacelnik, A. (1988). Scalar expectancy theory and 
choice between delayed rewards. Psychological Review  95(1), 102-114.  
Green, L., Fry, A. F., & Myerson, J. (1994). Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span 
Comparison. Psychological Science, 5(1), 33-36.  
Green, L., Myerson, J., Lichtman, D., Rosen, S., & Fry, A. (1996). Temporal discounting in 
choice between delayed rewards: the role of age and income. Psychology and Aging, 
11(1), 79-84.  
Individual differences in choice and timing    33 
 
Haldane, J. B. S. (1956). The estimation and significance of the logarithm of a ratio of 
frequencies. Annals of Human Genetics, 20(4), 309-311. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
1809.1955.tb01285.x 
Han, R., & Takahashi, T. (2012). Psychophysics of time perception and valuation in temporal 
discounting of gain and loss. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 
391(24), 6568-6576. doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2012.07.012 
Harzem, P. (1984). Experimental analysis of individual differences and personality. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 42(3), 385-395.  
Heerey, E. A., Robinson, B. M., McMahon, R. P., & Gold, J. M. (2007). Delay discounting in 
schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 12(3), 213-221. doi: 
10.1080/13546800601005900 
Heilbronner, S. R., & Meck, W. H. (2013). Dissociations between interval timing and 
intertemporal choice following administration of fluoxetine, cocaine, or 
methamphetamine. Behavioural Processes. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2013.09.013 
Hodos, W. (1961). Progressive ratio as a measure of reward strength. Science, 134(3483), 943-
944. doi: 10.1126/science.134.3483.943 
Housden, C. R., O'Sullivan, S. S., Joyce, E. M., Lees, A. J., & Roiser, J. P. (2010). Intact reward 
learning but elevated delay discounting in Parkinson's disease patients with impulsive-
compulsive spectrum behaviors. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35, 2155-2164. doi: 
10.1038/npp.2010.84 
Imhoff, S., Harris, M., Weiser, J., & Reynolds, B. (2013). Delay discounting by depressed and 
non-depressed adolescent smokers and non-smokers. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. doi: 
10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2013.11.014 
Individual differences in choice and timing    34 
 
Jimura, K., Myerson, J., Hilgard, J., Keighley, J., Braver, T. S., & Green, L. (2011). Domain 
independence and stability in young and older adults’ discounting of delayed rewards. 
Behavioural Processes, 87(3), 253-259.  
Johnson, M. W., Bickel, W. K., & Baker, F. (2007). Moderate drug use and delay discounting: A 
comparison of heavy, light, and never smokers. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 15(2), 187-194.  
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007). The neural correlates of subjective value during 
intertemporal choice. Nature Neuroscience, 10(12), 1625-1633.  
Kalenscher, T., & van Wingerden, M. (2011). Why we should use animals to study economic 
decision making - a perspective. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 5(82). doi: 
10.3389/fnins.2011.00082 
Killeen, P. R. (1995). Economics, ecologics, and mechanics: the dynamics of responding under 
conditions of varying motivation. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
64(3), 405-431. doi: 10.1901/jeab.1995.64-405 
Kim, B. K., & Zauberman, G. (2009). Perception of Anticipatory Time in temporal Discounting. 
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 2(2), 91-101.  
Kirby, K. N. (2009). One-year temporal stability of delay-discount rates. Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 16(3), 457-462.  
Kirkpatrick, K., Marshall, A. T., Clarke, J., & Cain, M. E. (2013). Environmental rearing effects 
on impulsivity and reward sensitivity. Behavioral Neuroscience, 127, 712-724. doi: 
10.1037/a0034124 
Individual differences in choice and timing    35 
 
Lawrence, K. A., Allen, J. S., & Chanen, A. M. (2010). Impulsivity in borderline personality 
disorder: reward-based decision-making and its relationship to emotional disorders. 
Journal of Personality Disorders, 24(6), 786-799. doi: 10.1521/pedi.2010.24.6.785 
Leon, M. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2003). Representation of time by neurons in the posterior parietal 
cortex of the macaque. Neuron, 38, 317-327.  
Locey, M. L., & Dallery, J. (2009). Isolating behavioral mechanisms of inter-temporal choice: 
Nicotine effects on delay discounting and amount sensitivity. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, 91(2), 213-223.  
MacKillop, J., & Kahler, C. W. (2009). Delayed reward discounting predicts treatment response 
for heavy drinkers receiving smoking cessation treatment. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, 104(3), 197-203. doi: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2009.04.020 
Marco, R., Miranda, A., Schlotz, W., Melia, A., Mulligan, A., Muller, U., . . . Sonuga-Barke, E. 
(2009). Delay and reward choice in ADHD: an experimental test of the role of delay 
aversion. Neuropsychology, 23(3), 367-380. doi: 10.1037/a0014914 
Marusich, J. A., Darna, M., Charnigo, R. J., Dwoskin, L. P., & Bardo, M. T. (2011). A 
multivariate assessment of individual differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity as 
predictors of amphetamine self-administration and prefrontal dopamine function in rats. 
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 19(4), 275-284.  
Matusiewicz, A. K., Carter, A. E., Landes, R. D., & Yi, R. (2013). Statistical equivalence and 
test-retest reliability of delay and probability discounting using real and hypothetical 
rewards. Behavioural Processes.  
Mazur, J. E. (1987). An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforcement Quantitative 
Analyses of Behavior (pp. 55-73). 
Individual differences in choice and timing    36 
 
McClure, J., Podos, J., & Richardson, H. N. (2014). Isolating the delay component of impulsive 
choice in adolescent rats. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 8(3). doi: 
10.3389/fnint.2014.00003 
McGuire, J. T., & Kable, J. W. (2012). Decision makers calibrate behavioral persistence on the 
basis of time-interval experience. Cognition, 124(2), 216-226. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.008 
McGuire, J. T., & Kable, J. W. (2013). Rational temporal predictions can underlie apparent 
failures to delay gratification. Psychological Review, 120(2), 395-410. doi: 
10.1037/a0031910 
McSweeney, F. K., Weatherly, J. N., & Swindell, S. (1996). Within-session changes in 
responding during delayed matching-to-sample and discrimination procedures. Animal 
Learning & Behavior, 24(3), 290-299. doi: 10.3758/BF03198977 
Mobini, S., Body, S., Ho, M.-Y., Bradshaw, C. M., Szabadi, E., Deakin, J. F. W., & Anderson, I. 
M. (2002). Effects of lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex on sensitivity to delayed and 
probabilistic reinforcement. Psychopharmacology, 160, 290-298. doi: 10.1007/s00213-
001-0983-0 
Myerson, J., Green, L., & Warusawitharana, M. (2001). Area under the curve as a measure of 
discounting. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 76(2), 235-243.  
Nenadic, I., Gaser, C., Volz, H.-P., Rammsayer, T., Häger, F., & Sauer, H. (2003). Processing of 
temporal information and the basal ganglia: new evidence from fMRI. Experimental 
Brain Research, 148, 238-246.  
Odum, A. L. (2011a). Delay discounting: I'm a k, you're a k. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, 96(3), 427-439.  
Individual differences in choice and timing    37 
 
Odum, A. L. (2011b). Delay discounting: Trait variable? Behavioural Processes, 87(1), 1-9.  
Odum, A. L., & Baumann, A. A. L. (2010). Delay discounting: state and trait variable. In G. J. 
Madden & W. K. Bickel (Eds.), Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological science of 
discounting (pp. 39-65). Washington,DC,: APA Books. 
Ohmura, Y., Takahashi, T., Kitamura, N., & Wehr, P. (2006). Three-month stability of delay and 
probability discounting measures. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 14, 
318-328.  
Perry, J. L., & Carroll, M. E. (2008). The role of impulsive behavior in drug abuse. 
Psychopharmacology, 200, 1-26.  
Peters, J., & Buchel, C. (2010). Neural representations of subjective reward value. Behavioural 
Brain Research, 213, 135-141.  
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2009). Overlapping and distinct neural systems code for subjective 
value during intertemporal and risky decision making. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 
15727-15734.  
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2011). The neural mechanisms of inter-temporal decision-making: 
understanding variability. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(5), 227-239.  
Rao, S. M., Mayer, A. R., & Harrington, D. L. (2001). The evolution of brain activation during 
temporal processing. Nature Neuroscience, 4(3), 317-323.  
Reynolds, B. (2006). A review of delay-discounting research with humans: Relations to drug use 
and gambling. Behavioural Pharmacology, 17, 651-667.  
Ripke, S., Hübner, T., Mennigen, E., Müller, K. U., Rodehacke, S., Schmidt, D., . . . Smolka, M. 
N. (2012). Reward processing and intertemporal decision making in adults and 
Individual differences in choice and timing    38 
 
adolescents: The role of impulsivity and decision consistency. Brain Research, 1478, 36-
47. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2012.08.034 
Roberts, S. (1981). Isolation of an internal clock. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 7(3), 242-268.  
Rubia, K., Halari, R., Christakou, A., & Taylor, E. (2009). Impulsiveness as a timing 
disturbance: neurocognitive abnormalities in attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
during temporal processes and normalization with methylphenidate. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 1919-1931. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0014 
Shamosh, N. A., & Gray, J. A. (2008). Delay discounting and intelligence: a meta-analysis. 
Intelligence, 36, 289-305. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2007.09.004 
Smith, A., Marshall, A. T., & Kirkpatrick, K. (under review). Mechanisms of impulsive choice: 
II. Time-based interventions to improve self-control.  
Solanto, M. V., Abikoff, H., Sonuga-Barke, E., Schachar, R., Logan, G. D., Wigal, T., . . . 
Turkel, E. (2001). The ecological validity of delay aversion and response inhibition as 
measures of impulsivity in AD/HD: A supplement to the NIMH multimodal treatment 
study of AD/HD. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29(3), 215-228.  
Sonuga-Barke, E. J., Taylor, E., Sembi, S., & Smith, J. (1992). Hyperactivity and delay aversion: 
I. The effect of delay on choice. Child Psychology & Psychiatry & Allied Disciplines, 
33(2), 387-398. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1992.tb00874.x 
Sripada, C. S., Gonzalez, R., Luan Phan, K., & Liberzon, I. (2011). The neural correlates of 
intertemporal decision-making: Contributions of subjective value, stimulus type, and trait 
impulsivity. Human Brain Mapping, 32(10), 1637-1648. doi: 10.1002/hbm.21136 
Individual differences in choice and timing    39 
 
Suarez, I., Lopera, F., Pineda, D., & Casini, L. (2013). The cognitive structure of time estimation 
impairments in adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 30(4), 195-207. doi: 10.1080/02643294.2013.842548 
Takahashi, T. (2005). Loss of self-control in intertemporal choice may be attributable to 
logarithmic time-perception. Medical Hypotheses, 65, 691-693.  
Tatham, T. A., & Zurn, K. R. (1989). The MED-PC experimental apparatus programming 
system. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 21(2), 294-302. doi: 
10.3758/BF03205598 
van den Broek, M. D., Bradshaw, C. M., & Szabadi, E. (1992). Performance of impulsive and 
non-impulsive subjects on two temporal differentiation tasks. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 13(2), 169-174. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(92)90039-R 
Verdejo-García, A., Lawrence, A. J., & Clark, L. (2008). Impulsivity as a vulnerability marker 
for substance-use disorders: Review of findings from high-risk research, problem 
gamblers and genetic association studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
32(4), 777-810. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.11.003 
Weller, R. E., Cook, E. W., Avsar, K. B., & Cox, J. E. (2008). Obese women show greater delay 
discounting than healthy-weight women. Appetite, 51, 563-568.  
Wilbertz, G., van Elst, L. T., Delgado, M. R., Maier, S., Feige, B., Philipsen, A., & Blechert, J. 
(2012). Orbitofrontal reward sensitivity and impulsivity in adult attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. NeuroImage, 60(1), 353-361. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.12.011 
Wittmann, M., & Paulus, M. P. (2008). Decision making, impulsivity and time perception. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(1), 7-12. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.10.004 
Individual differences in choice and timing    40 
 
Zauberman, G., Kim, B. K., Malkoc, S. A., & Bettman, J. R. (2009). Discounting Time and Time 
Discounting: Subjective Time Perception and Intertemporal Preferences. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 46(4), 543-556.  
  
Individual differences in choice and timing    41 
 
Acknowledgements 
 The authors would like to thank Dr. Tiffany Galtress for her assistance with data 
collection.  The research was presented at the Society for Quantitative Analyses of Behavior in 
May, 2013.  This research was supported by NIMH grant RO1-MH085739 awarded to Kimberly 
Kirkpatrick and Kansas State University.  Aaron Smith is now at the Department of Psychology, 
University of Kentucky. 
  
Individual differences in choice and timing    42 
 
Table 1.  Mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) of the cumulative logistic functions fitted to the 
individual rat’s psychophysical functions from the temporal bisection task (Figure 2). 
 
Rat Mean (μ) St. Dev. (σ) 
1 7.7 0.8 
2 7.0 1.2 
3 6.4 2.3 
4 7.9 3.3 
5 6.9 0.8 
6 8.2 1.6 
7 6.9 0.7 
8 7.2 0.9 
9 8.7 1.1 
10 6.3 0.6 
11 6.3 0.6 
12 7.6 1.0 
 
  
Individual differences in choice and timing    43 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Log odds of larger-later (LL) choices as a function of the smaller-sooner (SS) reward 
delay for the individual rats in the Delay Group (lines). The bars represent the group mean.  
Figure 2.  Proportion of choices for the long lever as a function of stimulus duration for the 
individual rats in the Delay Group within the temporal bisection task (lines).  The bars represent 
the group mean. 
Figure 3.  Breakpoint in the progressive-interval (PI) task as a function of the size that the PI 
increment with each reinforcer delivery for the individual rats in the Delay Group (lines).  The 
bars represent the group mean. 
Figure 4.  Top panel: The individual rat’s impulsive choice mean plotted against the standard 
deviation (σ) of the fitted logistic function of the individual’s psychophysical functions from the 
temporal bisection task.  Bottom panel: The individual rat’s impulsive choice mean plotted 
against the mean breakpoint within the progressive-interval (PI) task.  The variance accounted 
for by the best fitting regression line is shown (R2). 
Figure 5.  Log odds of larger-later (LL) choices as a function of the smaller-sooner (SS) reward 
delay for the individual rats in the Magnitude Group (lines). The bars represent the group mean. 
Figure 6.  Discrimination ratio (DR) between the large-lever and small-lever response rates as a 
function of the large-lever reward magnitude for the individual rats in the Magnitude Group 
(lines).  The bars represent the group mean. 
Figure 7.  Breakpoint in the progressive-ratio (PR) task as a function of the number of food 
pellets received with each reinforcer delivery for the individual rats in the Magnitude Group 
(lines).  The bars represent the group mean. 
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Figure 8.  The individual rat’s discrimination ratio (DR) mean from the reward magnitude 
sensitivity task (the mean across the 2, 3, and 4 pellet phases) plotted against the overall mean 
breakpoint in the progressive ratio (PR) task. 
